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Abstract   
The empirical literature on internalization has found a positive relationship between advertising intensity and 
foreign direct investment. The model presented in this paper explains this evidence by a technological change in 
the communications environment and makes predictions for other cost-reducing investments. We consider a 
market in which a single producer launches a new product. At first potential buyers are unaware of the product 
and its price, and the producer decides the optimal advertising strategy. We find that both advertising spending 
and investment in per unit cost reduction are higher under targeting than under mass advertising when the 
advertising technology exhibits marginal economies of targeting. 
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In ￿Boundaries of Multinational Enterprises and the Theory of International Trade￿James
Markusen (1995) o⁄ers a number of micro facts to evaluate the so-called ￿new trade theory￿ .
Among broadly agreed-upon ￿ndings, he notes that multinationals tend to be important in
industries and ￿rms characterized by a high level of marketing expenditure1.
The internalization theory2 posits that foreign direct investment (FDI) should occur
when a ￿rm can increase its value by internalizing markets for certain intangible assets,
such as technological know-how, advertising, product di⁄erentiation, and consumer goodwill.
Such intangible assets are said to share some of the characteristics of public goods, so that
to realize the potential additional value of employing them abroad, a ￿rm must internalize
the market for them by engaging in international direct investment3.
This paper argues that the observed positive relationship between marketing expenditure
and FDI can be explained by a technological change in the communications environment.
Moreover, FDI is only one of many cost-reducing investments (CRI) that can be triggered
by this technological ￿ revolution￿ . Other ways to a⁄ect unit costs, for instance, are lobbying
for labor market deregulation or investing in R&D to improve the production process.
Our story goes as follows. People are spending less time reading newspapers and maga-
zines and watching broadcast TV but are going to the cinema more, listening to more radio,
watching more cable and satellite TV and turning to a new medium, the Internet (The
Economist, 2004). For a long time ￿rms have used the mass media (newspapers, magazines,
broadcast TV, etc.) to reach their potential customers. However, the improvements in
information technology and the di⁄usion of new communication media (cable and satellite
TV, outdoor advertising, specialized magazines, Internet, etc.) has led marketers to shift
away from mass marketing, and to develop more and more highly focused marketing pro-
grams aimed at customers in more narrowly de￿ned micromarkets. As a result advertisers
are shifting larger portions of their budgets to media that target more e⁄ectively. Moreover,
in choosing among media types, advertisers take into consideration the nature of the prod-
1Grubaugh 1987 has shown that advertising intensity, R&D expenditures and product diversity increase
a ￿rm￿ s probability of being multinational. Merck and Yeung 1991 show that the market value of a ￿rm
is positively related to its multinational structure and that the relationship is explained by the presence of
intangible assets. Finally, Merck and Yeung 1992 use an event study approach to show that advertising
spending increases the probability of a positive stock price reaction to foreign direct investment among large
￿rms.
2This view is developed in Hymer 1976, Caves 1971, Dunning 1973, Williamson 1975, Buckley and Casson
1976, Rugman 1981, and others.
3The internalization theory thus implies that when ￿rms possessing signi￿cant intangible assets expand
abroad, shareholders￿wealth increases owing to the larger scale over which the intangible assets are applied.
￿1 ￿uct (for instance, fashions are best advertised in color magazines; Kotler 2002, Kotler and
Armstrong 1998). This last point makes one wonder whether the changing environment has
had an asymmetric impact on di⁄erent industries. Our conjecture is that industries and
products better suited to the new media vehicles have bene￿ted more from the ￿ revolution￿
and that the new advertising strategy has had an in￿ uence both on advertising spending and
on the incentives to engage in cost-reducing investment. If this conjecture is valid, the data
should show a positive relationship between advertising intensity and a ￿rm￿ s probability
of being multinational for those industries and companies that are doing less broadcasting
and more ￿narrowcasting￿ .
This theory has the advantage of o⁄ering an explanation for the fact that some industries
and ￿rms have a higher level of advertising expenditure, while the internalization theory
does not explain why intangible assets should di⁄er by industry or over time. To study
the interaction between alternative advertising strategies and cost-reducing investment, we
examine a market in which a single producer launches a new product. Initially, potential
buyers are unaware of the existence of the product and of its price, so the producer must
decide the optimal advertising strategy.
Our model is therefore also related to the economics literature on informative adver-
tising that is directly informative, i.e., advertising that conveys ￿ hard￿information4. More
speci￿cally, this paper contributes to the smaller body of literature on specialized advertis-
ing media that allow sellers to target ads to particular segments of the potential market5.
The paper most closely related to the present study is Esteban, HernÆndez and Moraga-
Gonzales (2006). They formulate a general advertising technology that encompasses others
in the literature and allows for the study of distinct strategies. They ￿nd a property of the
technology that they call strong economies of targeting, under which targeting is preferred to
mass advertising6. There are strong economies of targeting when advertising costs decrease
and the consumer audience increases when ads are shifted from less to more specialized me-
dia. We posit the same advertising technology to study a di⁄erent question: how advertising
expenditure and cost-reducing investment are in￿ uenced by di⁄erent advertising strategies.
We ￿nd that both spending and cost-reducing investment are greater with targeting than
with mass advertising when the marginal cost of ads is non-increasing and the marginal
probability of getting informed is non-decreasing when advertisers shift from less to more
4See among others Butters 1977, Shapiro 1980, Grossman and Shapiro 1984, Robert and Stahl 1993, Stahl
1994 and Stegeman, 1991.
5See for instance Grossman and Shapiro 1984, Bester and Petrakis 1996, HernÆndez-Garc￿a 1997, Esteban,
Gil and HernÆndez 2001, and Esteban, HernÆndez and Moraga-Gonzales 2006.
6Esteban, HernÆndez and Moraga-Gonzales 2006 also study the question of how advertising strategy bears
on product design strategy.
￿2 ￿specialized media. We call this property marginal economies of targeting.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and char-
acterizes the results. Section 3 concludes with a review of the empirical predictions. All
proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Model and Analysis
Consider a ￿rm that produces and markets a new product. Let c(f) denote the marginal
cost of producing one unit of the good. Marginal cost is decreasing in CRI, i.e., in the
amount of money f invested to reduce unit production costs. A way to a⁄ect unit costs is
to invest in wage-reducing practices, such as locating a production plant in a country that
o⁄ers a location advantage in term of cheap factor prices, or lobbying legislators to lower the
minimum wage. Another possibility is investing in R&D to improve the production process.
Let Q(p) be the (potential) demand function and P(q) the inverse demand function. We
assume that P(q) is twice di⁄erentiable, downward sloping and concave.
Potential buyers do not know of the product￿ s existence and price, so the potential
demand will not be realized unless consumers are informed about the product. Esteban,
HernÆndez and Moraga-Gonzales (EHMG 2006) present an advertising technology that al-
lows the producer to choose the target of the advertisement. A unitary mass of potential
consumers buy at most a single unit of the good. Consumers￿valuations are ordered and
decreasing in the unit interval [0;1]: In particular, EHMG consider that for any t in the
unit interval [0;1]; there is at least one advertising medium able to reach potential buyers
in [0;t]: They call the target of the advertising campaign t and talk of ￿mass advertising￿
when t = 1; i.e. ads are sent to the entire population; and of ￿customer directed adver-
tising￿ when t = Q(p); i.e. ads are sent only to those consumers who are willing to buy
the product at price p. An advertising technology is described as the combination of two
elements: the cost of advertising A(n;t) and the probability r(n;t) with which a consumer
in [0;t] becomes informed. Both the cost and the probability are functions of the number
of ads n and the target t: Assume that both cost and the probability are not decreasing in
the number of ads, i.e., An(n;t) > 0 and rn(n;t) > 0:
We now introduce two fundamental properties of the advertising technology with respect
to the target t.
The ￿rst de￿nition is the property ￿rst introduced in EHMG.
De￿nition 1 An advertising technology fA(n;t); r(n;t)g presents strong economies of
targeting whenever, for any given number of ads n, (i) At(n;t) > 0, and (ii) r(n;t) +
trt(n;t) < 0.
￿3 ￿In words, we have strong economies of targeting when, for a given number of ads, adver-
tising costs decrease and consumer awareness increases as we move ads from less to more
specialized advertising media.
We now introduce a new property.
De￿nition 2 An advertising technology fA(n;t); r(n;t)g presents marginal economies
of targeting whenever, (iii) Ant(n;t) > 0, and (iv) r(n;t) + trnt(n;t) 6 0.
That is, we have marginal economies of targeting when the marginal cost of ads is non-
increasing and the marginal probability of getting informed is non-decreasing with the shift
of ads from less to more specialized media.
As we are mainly interested in studying the behaviour of f and n; we start by taking t
as an exogenous characteristic of the technology. Then the monopolist￿ s problem consists
in solving the following program7:
Max
q;f;n
[P(q) ￿ c(f)]qr(n;t) ￿ A(n;t) ￿ f: (1)
Our purpose is to study how f and n vary as we move from mass advertising (t = 1)
to (a technology that permits) more targeted advertising (t < 1). To make this comparison
using Topkis￿Monotonicity Theorem (Topkis 1978, but see also Milgrom and Shannon 1994)




l(f;n;t) = [P(q (f)) ￿ c(f)]q (f)r(n;t) ￿ A(n;t) ￿ f: (2)
Intuitively, this is a dynamic programming approach: ￿rst, for any given values of f
and n we write the maximum value of (1) and then choose f and n to maximize the value
function (2)8. If l(f;n;t) is supermodular and has increasing di⁄erences, we can apply
Topkis￿Monotonicity Theorem9. For smooth functions in RN we can use the following
result, always following Topkis (1978).
Lemma 1 Let l : R2￿R ￿! R be twice continuously di⁄erentiable. Then l has increasing
di⁄erences in (x;t) if and only if @2
@x@tl() > 0 for x = f;n and l is supermodular in x if
and only if @2
@f@nl() > 0:
7While the monopolist￿ s problem should be written [P(q) ￿ c(f)]minfq;tgr(n;t) ￿ A(n;t) ￿ f; it is
straightforward to show by contradiction that q 6 t: Assume q > t; then the monopolist￿ s pro￿ts decrease
with quantity (P
0
(q) < 0). Therefore, the equilibrium quantity will be zero, but q = 0 6 t.
8q (f) is the implicit solution to P
0
(q)q + P(q) ￿ c(f) = 0:
9The version of Topkis￿Monotonicity Theorem needded for our purposes is the following: Let l : R
2￿R ￿!
R: If l is supermodular in x = (f;n) and has increasing di⁄erences in (x;t); then argmaxl(x;t) is monotone
non-decreasing in t:
￿4 ￿We are now able to prove the following Proposition.
Proposition 1 If the advertising technology exhibits (ii
0
) rt(n;t) 6 0, (iii) Ant(n;t) > 0,
and (iv0) rnt(n;t) 6 0, then unit cost reducing investment, f; and advertising intensity, n;
are non-increasing in t:
When consumer awareness increases, as we move to (a technology that permits) more
targeted advertising (rt(n;t) 6 0), the expected sales of the ￿rm given f and n increase.
This creates an incentive to increase revenue by investing in unit cost reduction f. At the
same time, reasons of cost and of e⁄ectiveness (Ant(n;t) > 0 and rnt(n;t) 6 0) favour
increased advertising intensity, reinforcing the positive e⁄ect on expected sales10.
As in EHMG now consider t a choice variable. We check whether we can still ￿nd
su¢ cient conditions such that expenditure for CRI, f; and advertising intensity, n; are
higher when ads are directed only to those consumers who are willing to buy the product
at price p, i.e., customer directed advertising than when they are directed to the entire
population, i.e., mass advertising. Di⁄erentiating (1) with respect to t gives
[P(q) ￿ c(f)]qrt(n;t) ￿ At(n;t): (3)
Thus if the sign of (3) is positive t = 1 and mass advertising arises in equilibrium. If the
sign of (3) is negative, recalling that q 6 t (see footnote 7), the choice of the ￿rm will be
t = q: We can summarize the foregoing with the following Proposition.
Proposition 2 The ￿rm employs mass advertising (M) if and only if
[P(q) ￿ c(f)]qrt(n;t) ￿ At(n;t) > 0; in which case tM = 1, and customer directed
advertising (D) if and only if [P(q) ￿ c(f)]qrt(n;t) ￿ At(n;t) < 0; in which case tD =
Q(p):
The optimal targeting strategy thus depends both upon the e⁄ectiveness of the alterna-
tive media and on their costs. Whether the advertising technology has the properties that
determine customer directed advertising (D) or mass advertising (M) is, after all, a matter
of empirical veri￿cation. While we can be con￿dent that consumer awareness increases as we
move to more specialized media (point (ii) in De￿nition 1)11, it is less clear that advertising
costs decrease (point (i) in De￿nition 1). Marketing scholars experts maintain that more
specialized advertising media have higher audience-attention probability (Kotler 2002). For
10Note that the for the moment we are using weaker assumptions than in De￿nitions 1 and 2; their
empirical validity is discussed later.
11Note that point (ii) in De￿nition 1 implies assumption (ii
0) in Proposition 1.
￿5 ￿instance, the probability that a targeted consumer will pay attention to at least one ad for
a diet product transmitted by cable TV programming formats on nutrition or published in
a magazine for young women is greater than the probability of reaching a consumer using a
general readership magazine. As to advertising costs, EHMG ￿nd some evidence based on
Dutch and Spanish press that At(n;t) > 0: But Stone (1996) claims that in many cases it
is more expensive to reach a partial readership in a target region or audience. Moreover, in
choosing media type, advertisers consider the nature of the product (for instance, fashions
are best advertised in color magazines (Kotler 2002, Kotler and Armstrong 1998), so some
industries and products that are well suited to be advertised through the new media vehicles
may have bene￿ted more from the changing communication environment. In other words,
the cost of the advertising technology with respect to the target t and the choice of the
advertising strategy could vary with the industry12.




[P(q) ￿ c(f)]qr(n;1) ￿ A(n;1) ￿ f: (4)
(D) : Max
q;f;n
[P(q) ￿ c(f)]qr(n;q) ￿ A(n;q) ￿ f: (5)
Before conducting the same comparative statics exercise as for the exogenous case, we
need two intermediate results.
Lemma 2 a) qD (f;n) < qM (f) for a given f and for any n. b) The sign of dqD (f;n)/df
is the same as that of r(n;t) + trt(n;t):





P(qM (f)) ￿ c(f)
￿





P(qD (f;n)) ￿ c(f)
￿
qD (f;n)r(n;qD (f;n)) ￿ A(n;qD (f;n)) ￿ f:
(7)
Now let us compare the solutions to these two maximization problems. To use Topkis￿
Monotonicity Theorem, we ￿rst parametrize the two problems (see Milgrom and Shannon
1994), by de￿ning the function
l(f;n;￿) =
(
g(f;n) when ￿ = 0;
h(f;n) when ￿ = 1:
12Note that assuming part (ii) of De￿nition 1 still allows for both advertising regimes to arise in equilibrium.
In that case, At(n;t) > 0 is su¢ cient but not necessary for (D). While, At(n;t) < 0 is necessary for (M)
but not su¢ cient.
￿6 ￿When the function l(f;n;￿) is supermodular we have, by Topkis, f (1) > f (0) and
n(1) > n(0);i.e., the solution of the second problem is greater than that of the ￿rst.
We can now prove the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 Assume the advertising technology exhibits (ii
00
) r(n;t) + trt(n;t) 6 0 and
marginal economies of targeting, i.e., (iii) Ant(n;t) > 0, and (iv) r(n;t) + trnt(n;t) 6 0.
Then the ￿rm will spend more on cost-reducing practices and will choose greater advertising
intensity under customer directed advertising (D) than under mass advertising (M), i.e.,
fD > fM and nD > nM:
To get the result, we now need somewhat stronger assumptions than in the exogenous
case treated in Proposition 1. The reasoning following Proposition 1 is still valid: as we
move from (M) to (D), greater consumer awareness (rt(n;t) < 0) increases expected sales,
fostering incentives to increase unit revenue by investing in cost reducing practices, f. At the
same time, reasons of cost and e⁄ectiveness (Ant(n;t) > 0 and rnt(n;t) < 0) favour increased
advertising intensity, reinforcing the positive e⁄ect on expected sales13. However, under (D)





) and (iv0)) are needed to ensure that the increase in the probability of selling
the product more than compensates for the decrease in quantity. The result is more actual
sales for customer directed advertising.
3 Conclusion
The empirical literature on internalization has found a positive relationship between adver-
tising intensity and the probability that the producer is a multinational. This evidence is
also compatible with the model presented. However, the argument here is that the joint
increase in marketing expenditure and in foreign direct investment can be explained by a
change in the communications environment. More conclusive empirical evidence could be
drawn both from cross section studies and from panel analysis. A cross section study could
investigate whether in the industries where a positive relationship between advertising in-
tensity and FDI has been found, ￿rms have adopted the targeted advertising strategy, while
panel analysis could con￿rm whether there is a temporal relation between the corporate
decision to go multinational and advertising strategy. One conjecture is that industries
and products better suited to the new media may have bene￿ted more or earlier from the
￿ revolution￿ . If this is valid, the data should show a positive relationship between advertis-
ing intensity and the probability of being multinational speci￿cally for the industries and
13Note that rt(n;t) < 0 is implied by assumption (ii
00
) and rnt(n;t) < 0 by assumption (iv).
￿7 ￿companies that do less broadcasting and more narrowcasting. Finally, the empirical predic-
tions concerning FDI should also extend to other cost-reducing investments such as R&D
or lobbying for labor market deregulation.
￿8 ￿Appendix





















(q)q + P(q) ￿ c(f)
i
> 0:
The result follows by recalling that rn(n;t) > 0; c
0














(q)q + P(q) ￿ c(f)
i
> 0: The
result follows by assumption (ii
0
) rt(n;t) 6 0; and again by recalling that c
0
(f) < 0





= ￿[P(q) ￿ c(f)]qrnt(n;￿e t) + Ant(n;￿e t) > 0: The result is a conse-
quence of assumption (iii) Ant(n;t) > 0, and (iv0) rnt(n;t) 6 0.
Proof of Lemma 2. a) Assume that the ￿rm employs a D strategy. Di⁄erentiating




(q)q + P(q) ￿ c(f)
i
r(n;q) + [P(q) ￿ c(f)]qrq(n;q) ￿ Aq(n;q) = 0: (A1)
The choice of D implies that [P(q) ￿ c(f)]qrq(n;q) ￿ Aq(n;q) < 0 and that P
0
(q)q +
P(q) ￿ c(f) > 0: Since P
0
(q)q + P(q) ￿ c(f) is a decreasing function of q (P
0
(q) < 0 and
P
00
(q) 6 0), it follows that qD (f;n) < qM (f) for a given f:
b) To obtain dqD (f;n)/df; we di⁄erentiate equation (A1) totally. Then, isolating
dqD (f;n)/df we get
dqD (f;n)=df = c0 (f)[r(n;q) + qrq(n;q)]=socq
The denominator is negative (assuming that the second order condition holds). Thus the
result follows recalling that c0 (f) is negative.
Proof of Proposition 3. Given Lemma 1 we only have to check the sign of the
following three derivatives:











@qM > 0: First note
that the second and third terms are both zero. Thus c0 < 0 together with the following
inequalities qMr(n;1) < qMr(n;qM) 6 qDr(n;qD) yield the result. Both inequalities
￿9 ￿are a consequence of (ii
00
). The ￿rst derives from rt(n;t) < 0 (which is implied by
(ii
00
)), and the second comes from
@tr(n;t)
t 6 0 (which is equivalent to (ii
00
)) and part

















@qD > 0: First note that the last term is zero.
Second, P(qD) > P(qM) due to the decreasing demand function and to qD < qM
(Lemma 2). Third, qMrn(n;1) < qMrn(n;qM) 6 qDrn(n;qD) where, following the
same logic as in point 1, all inequalities can be shown to be a consequence of (iv)
and qD < qM. Last, assumption (iii) implies An(n;1) > An(n;tD): The sign of the
derivative follows by the four preceding steps;























> 0: The ￿rst





q + P ￿ c
￿
= 0: The last term is non-negative because it is the product of two
parts that are both non-positive.
dqD
df 6 0 from part b) of Lemma 2 and assumption (ii
00
).
In the square bracket, all terms are non-positive: the ￿rst because of assumption (iv); the
second because of the decreasing demand function and rn(n;t) > 0; the last because of
assumption (iii).
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